Abstract
In this article we analyze the problem of whether a person who considers his own life as damage may file a complaint against who allowed his birth (wrongful life). The dominant doctrine argues that the award of such compensation would recognize the person a right not to be born, defending that such right does not exist. However, in this type of claims life is not the damage itself, but living with disability. We sustain that wrongful life actions do not contend with the inalienability of human life, and that the respect for the dignity of human life enforces the award of compensation to ensure life with a minimum of conditions.
Full PaperFernando Dias Simões
Senior Research Associate
Professor Dias Simões is Associate Professor at the Faculty of Law of the Chinese University of Hong Kong (Hong Kong, China)
Summary
In this article we analyze the problem of whether a person who considers his own life as damage may file a complaint against who allowed his birth (wrongful life). The dominant doctrine argues that the award of such compensation would recognize the person a right not to be born, defending that such right does not exist. However, in this type of claims life is not the damage itself, but living with disability. We sustain that wrongful life actions do not contend with the inalienability of human life, and that the respect for the dignity of human life enforces the award of compensation to ensure life with a minimum of conditions.